Al-Qaeda is a militant Sunni Islamist network founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988 that orchestrated the September 11, 2001, attacks and continues to operate today through a set of regional affiliates across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Decades of counterterrorism operations have killed most of its original leaders and degraded its central command, but the group’s franchise model has kept it alive, and U.S. intelligence still assesses that it intends to strike American targets.
How Al-Qaeda Started
The organization grew out of the Soviet-Afghan War. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, thousands of Arab volunteers traveled to fight alongside the Afghan resistance, funneled into the conflict through recruitment networks based in Pakistan. The most important of those networks, the Maktab al-Khidamat, was built by the Palestinian cleric Abdullah Azzam. Osama bin Laden, the son of a Saudi construction magnate, was Azzam’s most significant financial backer.
On August 11, 1988, bin Laden and a small group of associates met in Peshawar, Pakistan, and formally established Al-Qaeda, Arabic for “the Base.” They conceived it as a vanguard organization that could carry the Afghan jihad’s fighters, money, and infrastructure forward into a permanent transnational movement once the Soviet war ended.
The event that turned the group’s focus onto the United States came in 1990. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia invited American troops to stage on its soil rather than accepting bin Laden’s offer to defend the kingdom with mujahideen fighters. Bin Laden treated the permanent stationing of U.S. forces near Mecca and Medina as a betrayal of Islam, and it became the central grievance driving Al-Qaeda’s war on the West.
What Al-Qaeda Believes
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is a militant strain of Sunni Islamism known as Salafi-jihadism, which treats armed struggle as a religious obligation. The group frames its violence as defensive, arguing that Muslims worldwide are under attack by Western powers and by the local governments those powers support. Its stated aim is to expel Western influence from Muslim-majority lands and replace the governments there with a unified Islamic state governed by its interpretation of religious law.
The “Far Enemy” Doctrine
What separated Al-Qaeda from earlier jihadist movements was bin Laden’s decision to prioritize attacks on the United States and its Western allies over strikes against Arab governments. He distinguished between the “near enemy,” the Muslim-majority regimes he considered illegitimate, and the “far enemy,” the Western nations that propped them up. His reasoning was that toppling a local regime accomplished little if a superpower could reinstall a friendly successor; cut the superpower’s willingness to stay involved, and the local regimes would collapse on their own.
That emphasis has shifted. Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates now spend most of their energy fighting local governments and holding territory, particularly in the Sahel and Somalia. The group’s messaging to Western audiences has taken on a more transactional tone: leave, and we leave you alone. But the intent to strike Western targets has never been formally abandoned.
The 1996 and 1998 Declarations
Bin Laden set out his case in two documents. In 1996, he issued a declaration of jihad demanding the withdrawal of American forces from Saudi Arabia. In February 1998, he co-signed a broader statement with Ayman al-Zawahiri and other militant leaders under the banner of the “World Islamic Front” that declared it an individual religious duty for every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and military, wherever possible. That declaration served as Al-Qaeda’s public mission statement and preceded its deadliest attacks by months.
The Attacks That Defined the Group
The 1998 East Africa Embassy Bombings
On August 7, 1998, truck bombs detonated almost simultaneously outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The blasts killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded more than 4,500.1Federal Bureau of Investigation. East African Embassy Bombings The Nairobi bombing killed roughly 212 people; the Dar es Salaam attack killed 11.2The National Museum of American Diplomacy. The August 7, 1998, East Africa Embassy Bombings The bombings announced Al-Qaeda as a serious operational threat capable of coordinating complex strikes across borders.
The USS Cole Bombing
On October 12, 2000, two suicide operatives piloted a small boat packed with explosives alongside the USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The blast ripped a 40-foot hole in the ship’s hull, killed 17 American sailors, and injured nearly 40.3Federal Bureau of Investigation. USS Cole Bombing The attack showed the group could reach hardened military targets, not only diplomatic facilities.
September 11, 2001
The idea originated with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who brought a “planes operation” concept to bin Laden in late 1998 or early 1999. His original plan called for ten hijacked aircraft; bin Laden scaled it back.4National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers commandeered four commercial airliners. Two struck the World Trade Center towers in New York, one struck the Pentagon, and one crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after passengers fought to retake the aircraft. The attacks killed 2,976 people and injured thousands more.5Federal Bureau of Investigation. 9/11 Investigation
The 9/11 Commission estimated the entire plot cost between $400,000 and $500,000, funded through wire transfers from overseas facilitators.6National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission Terrorist Financing Monograph The gap between the operation’s cost and its consequence became part of the group’s appeal to future militants.
Leadership and Succession
Al-Qaeda was originally organized as a hierarchy. A Shura Council of senior members advised the emir, bin Laden, and oversaw committees for military operations, finances, media, and religious rulings. That structure let the group plan and execute long, complex operations. It also created a single point of failure once the United States dismantled its Afghan sanctuary and began systematically killing senior figures.
On May 2, 2011, U.S. special operations forces raided a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and killed Osama bin Laden.7The White House. Osama Bin Laden Dead His longtime deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, took over and moved the organization toward strategic messaging and ideological guidance rather than direct operational control. Regional affiliates gained more autonomy under him.
Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, by a U.S. drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan. Two Hellfire missiles struck the house where he was standing on a balcony; he was the only casualty.8Department of Defense. U.S. Drone Strike Kills al-Qaida Leader in Kabul That he was living openly in the Afghan capital barely a year after the U.S. withdrawal confirmed longstanding concerns about the Taliban’s continued relationship with Al-Qaeda.
The group has not publicly named a successor. The de facto leader is widely assessed to be Sayf al-Adel, a former Egyptian army colonel and founding member who has headed Al-Qaeda’s military committee since 2001. Al-Adel is believed to be based in Iran under an arrangement whose exact terms remain unclear.9Federal Bureau of Investigation. Saif al-Adel His distance from active theaters raises real questions about how much command he can exercise.
Legal Designations and the U.S. Response
The September 11 attacks triggered the most extensive counterterrorism campaign in modern history. On October 7, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, invading Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda’s infrastructure and remove the Taliban government that sheltered it. U.S. Special Forces and Afghan Northern Alliance fighters toppled the Taliban within weeks, though bin Laden escaped the siege of his Tora Bora mountain complex in December 2001. The war became the longest in U.S. history, lasting until the American withdrawal in August 2021.
The legal framework for choking off Al-Qaeda’s finances came almost immediately. Executive Order 13224, signed on September 23, 2001, authorized the U.S. government to freeze the assets of individuals and entities that commit or pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism, along with those who provide support or services to designated terrorists.10U.S. Department of State. Executive Order 13224 Once a person or entity is designated, all property they hold within the United States or under the control of U.S. persons is blocked, and virtually all transactions involving that property are prohibited.
Internationally, the UN Security Council had already established a sanctions regime targeting the Taliban through Resolution 1267 in 1999. That framework was later expanded to cover Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, imposing asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes on designated individuals and entities.11United Nations Security Council. Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267
How Al-Qaeda Pays for Itself
The image of bin Laden bankrolling the organization from a personal fortune does not match the record. The 9/11 Commission found that his annual inheritance amounted to roughly $1 million per year through the early 1990s and that he had no access to significant personal wealth after relocating to Afghanistan in 1996. Al-Qaeda’s actual pre-9/11 operating budget was around $30 million a year, raised almost entirely through donations from sympathizers in the Gulf, diversions from Islamic charities, and a network of financial facilitators who gathered money from both knowing and unknowing donors.6National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission Terrorist Financing Monograph
The largest single expense was subsidizing the Taliban, which consumed an estimated $20 million per year. Training camps, planning, and support for fighters and their families accounted for most of the rest. The commission also found no persuasive evidence that Al-Qaeda relied significantly on the drug trade, conflict diamonds, or direct sponsorship from any foreign government beyond the Taliban’s in-kind support.6National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission Terrorist Financing Monograph
To move money, the group relied on hawala networks (informal money transfer systems common in South Asia and the Middle East), bulk cash couriers, and, to a lesser extent, conventional banks. The post-9/11 crackdown on terrorist financing disrupted these channels and pushed affiliates to become more self-sufficient. Al-Shabaab now generates revenue through local taxation and extortion in the areas it controls and funnels money back to Al-Qaeda’s central leadership.
Al-Qaeda Is Not ISIS
The two groups are often confused. ISIS began as Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate, originally led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and clashed for years with the central leadership over tactics. Bin Laden and Zawahiri wanted attacks focused on the United States. Zarqawi and his successors prioritized sectarian warfare against Shia Muslims and extreme brutality against anyone they deemed apostates. Zawahiri warned that this approach would alienate ordinary Muslims.
The break came in Syria. When the civil war opened space for jihadist groups, Zawahiri encouraged the creation of Jabhat al-Nusra as a separate, Syrian-led Al-Qaeda affiliate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then leading the Iraqi branch, instead declared Nusra subordinate to his organization and rebranded the combined entity as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Nusra refused and pledged loyalty directly to Zawahiri. In February 2014, Zawahiri publicly disavowed Baghdadi’s group, formally severing the relationship. When Baghdadi declared a caliphate in June 2014, he claimed authority over all Muslims worldwide, directly challenging Al-Qaeda’s own aspirations. The two organizations have competed for affiliate loyalty ever since.
Where Al-Qaeda Operates Today
Al-Qaeda today runs mainly through semi-autonomous regional affiliates that pledge allegiance to the central leadership while conducting their own campaigns tailored to local conflicts. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment from the U.S. Intelligence Community states that Al-Qaeda maintains its intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens across its global affiliates, and that its leaders have tried to exploit anti-Israeli sentiment over the war in Gaza to encourage attacks on Israeli and American targets.12Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025
The most operationally active branches include:
- Al-Shabaab in Somalia is Al-Qaeda’s largest and wealthiest affiliate, with an estimated 7,000 to 12,000 fighters as of late 2023. It controls large portions of south-central Somalia, funds Al-Qaeda operations outside the country, and has developed a growing relationship with Yemen’s Houthis that could give it access to more sophisticated weapons.13European Union Agency for Asylum. Al-Shabaab Control Areas, Presence, and Influence12Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025
- Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, is the group’s West African affiliate, expanding across Mali, Burkina Faso, and neighboring countries. It has besieged major cities in northern Mali and operates in 11 of Burkina Faso’s 13 regions. U.S. intelligence assesses that JNIM is threatening urban centers where U.S. personnel are located.12Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025
- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, based in Yemen, has historically been the affiliate most focused on striking the Western homeland. It has relaunched its Inspire propaganda publication with instructions for bomb-making and attacks on civilian aircraft, and continues to encourage attacks against Jewish targets, the United States, and Europe.12Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025
- Hurras al-Din, the group’s Syrian affiliate, publicly announced its dissolution in early 2025, reportedly on orders from senior leaders in Iran. U.S. intelligence assesses that members were told not to disarm and to prepare for future conflict, suggesting the dissolution may be tactical.12Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community 2025
Al-Qaeda Central’s ability to plan and execute the kind of spectacular, centrally directed attack it carried out on September 11 has diminished. Two decades of leadership decapitation, financial disruption, and surveillance have taken a toll. But the franchise model has kept the brand alive through affiliates that exploit civil wars, weak governance, and local grievances to recruit and hold territory. The Sahel in particular has become the most dynamic theater of Al-Qaeda-linked activity, with JNIM expanding at a pace that has alarmed Western intelligence agencies.