Penalties for violating federal antitrust law range from criminal fines up to $100 million per corporation and 10 years in prison per individual, to civil judgments that triple a victim’s actual damages, to being cut off from federal contracts. The Department of Justice prosecutes the most serious conduct as felonies. The Federal Trade Commission and private plaintiffs handle civil enforcement. Because criminal fines, government remedies, and private lawsuits often stack onto the same conduct, total exposure can climb quickly past any single statutory cap.
Criminal Fines and Prison Under the Sherman Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act makes the worst anticompetitive conduct a federal felony. Section 1 covers agreements between competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or divide markets. Section 2 covers monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize. Both sections carry the same maximum penalties.1GovInfo. 15 USC 1 – Trusts, Etc., in Restraint of Trade Illegal2Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 15 USC 2 – Monopolizing Trade a Felony; Penalty
- Corporations: fines up to $100 million per offense.
- Individuals: fines up to $1 million per offense, up to 10 years in federal prison, or both.
Those numbers are not always the ceiling. A separate federal sentencing statute lets a court impose a fine equal to twice the gross gain the conspirators earned from the scheme, or twice the gross loss suffered by victims, whichever is greater, when that figure exceeds the standard maximum.3Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 USC 3571 – Sentence of Fine In large price-fixing or bid-rigging cases involving hundreds of millions in affected commerce, this alternative calculation routinely produces corporate fines well above $100 million.
Prison time is real. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division actively prosecutes executives who take part in cartel activity, and sentences in the range of one to five years are common in contested cases. A felony conviction also destroys careers, strips professional licenses in regulated industries, and creates immigration consequences for non-citizen defendants.
Government Civil Enforcement
Not every antitrust violation warrants a criminal case. The DOJ and the FTC both bring civil actions aimed at stopping the conduct and restoring competitive conditions rather than sending people to prison.4Federal Trade Commission. The Enforcers
Injunctions and Consent Decrees
The most common civil remedy is a court order that prohibits the anticompetitive conduct going forward. A court can issue a preliminary injunction while the case is pending or a permanent injunction as part of a final judgment. Many cases settle through a consent decree, in which the company commits to specific behavioral changes without admitting liability.5Department of Justice. Civil Enforcement The FTC works similarly, first trying to reach a voluntary consent order and then issuing an administrative complaint or going to federal court for injunctive relief if negotiations fail.4Federal Trade Commission. The Enforcers Companies that later violate an FTC consent order face civil penalties for each violation.
Structural Remedies in Merger Cases
When a merger threatens to substantially reduce competition, the DOJ and FTC can challenge the transaction in court or negotiate structural fixes. The standard remedy is divestiture, where the merged company sells off assets or entire business units to restore a competitive market.6Federal Trade Commission. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition on Negotiating Merger Remedies The DOJ may also seek an injunction blocking the deal entirely if no structural fix can preserve competition.7U.S. Department of Justice. Merger Remedies Manual
Limits on FTC Monetary Relief
One important boundary: after the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management v. FTC, the FTC can no longer use its Section 13(b) authority to seek monetary remedies like disgorgement of profits or restitution. The Court held that provision authorizes only forward-looking injunctive relief. The FTC can still pursue monetary penalties when a company violates a final cease-and-desist order or breaks an FTC-issued rule, but recovering ill-gotten gains from a first-time violator through the FTC’s own proceedings has become far more difficult.
Private Lawsuits and Treble Damages
Federal antitrust law does not leave enforcement entirely to the government. Any person or business injured by anticompetitive conduct can sue in federal court under Section 4 of the Clayton Act and recover three times their actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.8Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 15 USC 15 – Suits by Persons Injured Tripling is mandatory. Once a plaintiff proves injury from an antitrust violation, the court must triple the award. A company that overcharged its customers by $10 million faces a $30 million judgment before legal fees enter the picture.
Private parties can also sue for injunctive relief to stop ongoing anticompetitive behavior. If a plaintiff substantially prevails in an injunction action, the court awards attorney’s fees as well.9Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 15 USC 26 – Injunctive Relief for Private Parties
The combination of automatic tripling, fee-shifting, and class actions makes private antitrust litigation enormously consequential. Class settlements regularly reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and in some cases have exceeded a billion. For defendants, private suits often dwarf the government’s penalties.
Who Can Actually Sue
One restriction narrows who can collect. Under the rule from Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (1977), only direct purchasers from the antitrust violator have standing to sue for damages under the Clayton Act. If a manufacturer fixes prices and sells to a distributor, and the distributor passes the overcharge along to a retailer, the retailer generally cannot sue in federal court because the overcharge came through an intermediary. Indirect purchasers are not entirely without recourse: a majority of states have enacted their own antitrust statutes that let indirect purchasers sue for damages in state court, and state attorneys general can bring suits on behalf of their residents under the parens patriae doctrine.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Filing Violations
Companies planning large acquisitions must comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which requires both parties to notify the FTC and DOJ before closing a deal that exceeds certain dollar thresholds. For 2026, the minimum filing threshold is $133.9 million in voting securities or assets.10Federal Trade Commission. FTC Announces 2026 Update of Jurisdictional and Fee Thresholds for Premerger Notification Filings
Failing to file, or closing before the mandatory waiting period expires, triggers a civil penalty of up to $54,540 per day of violation, adjusted annually for inflation.11Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 15 USC 18a – Premerger Notification and Waiting Period Those daily penalties add up fast. A company that closes a reportable deal even a few weeks early can face millions in fines before any question about the merger’s competitive effects is raised. The penalty reaches individuals, officers, and directors, not only the corporate entity.
How Leniency Reduces Exposure
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division runs a Corporate Leniency Policy that lets a company involved in price-fixing, bid-rigging, or market allocation avoid criminal prosecution entirely by being the first to report the conspiracy and cooperate fully with the investigation.12United States Department of Justice. Leniency Policy
The program distinguishes two scenarios. A company that comes forward before the DOJ has opened an investigation (a Type A application) receives essentially automatic immunity if it meets the program’s requirements. A company that applies after an investigation is already underway (a Type B application) can still qualify, but only if the DOJ does not yet have enough evidence to sustain a conviction on its own. Individuals can also apply for leniency independently under a separate policy. In both tracks, the applicant must admit wrongdoing candidly and provide ongoing cooperation, including making witnesses available and producing documents.
Criminal immunity alone would not be enough incentive if the applicant still faced the full force of private treble-damages litigation. Congress addressed that through the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA), which limits the civil exposure of a company that receives DOJ leniency. Rather than facing treble damages and joint-and-several liability for the entire conspiracy’s harm, a qualifying leniency recipient is liable only for single (actual) damages caused by its own conduct. To qualify, the company must cooperate with private plaintiffs by providing a full account of the facts and producing relevant documents.
Debarment From Federal Contracts
Beyond fines and damages, an antitrust conviction can cut a company off from federal contracting work. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, a conviction for violating federal or state antitrust laws related to the submission of bids or offers is an independent basis for debarment.13Acquisition.GOV. Causes for Debarment The standard debarment period generally does not exceed three years, though the length is calibrated to the seriousness of the violation.14Acquisition.GOV. Subpart 9.4 – Debarment, Suspension, and Ineligibility
For companies that depend on government contracts, debarment can be worse than the fine. A three-year ban from competing for federal work can wipe out a significant revenue stream and permanently damage a company’s market position. Subcontractors and joint-venture partners often sever ties with a debarred firm even for non-government work.
Deadline for Private Claims
A private plaintiff has four years from the date the cause of action accrues to file a treble-damages suit under the Clayton Act.15Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 15 USC 15b – Limitation of Actions The clock typically starts when the injury occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it.
That four-year window creates a problem when the violation is a secret cartel that victims cannot detect. Courts have recognized a fraudulent concealment doctrine that pauses the clock until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the conspiracy. Where a DOJ criminal investigation or guilty plea brings the conspiracy into public view, the four-year clock effectively resets for private plaintiffs who had no earlier way to know they were being harmed.