The Colorado River plan is the new operating framework that federal officials and the seven basin states are trying to put in place before the current rules expire on September 30, 2026. The Bureau of Reclamation is running the process through a formal environmental review, and in June 2026 it announced that if the states cannot agree, it will impose its own 10-year management framework starting with the 2027 water year.1 The stakes are large: about 40 million people, tribal nations with senior water rights, farms across the Southwest, and hydropower at Glen Canyon and Hoover dams all depend on how the river is divided from here forward.
Why New Rules Are Needed by October 2026
The river has been managed since 2007 under interim guidelines, supplemented by the 2019 Drought Contingency Plans signed by the seven states and the Department of the Interior. Those agreements set tiered shortage triggers tied to Lake Mead’s elevation and allowed coordinated releases from upstream reservoirs to prop up Lake Powell during dry years. All of them expire at the end of 2026. New rules have to be in place by October 1 to govern the 2027 water year.
The pressure comes from a gap between what the river produces and what has been promised. The 1922 Colorado River Compact allocated 7.5 million acre-feet a year to each basin, and the 1944 Water Treaty committed another 1.5 million acre-feet to Mexico, for a total of 16.5 million acre-feet. Actual flows have averaged about 12.5 million acre-feet since 2000. The 25-year average measured at Lees Ferry is roughly 12.4 million. Climate projections suggest another 20 to 30 percent decline is possible, and a Bureau of Reclamation basin study projected a long-term supply-demand imbalance of about 3.2 million acre-feet by 2060.
The reservoirs show the strain. As of April 2026, Lake Powell sat near elevation 3,528 feet, just under 24 percent of capacity and only 36 feet above the 3,490-foot threshold where hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam stops. Lake Mead entered 2026 in a Tier 1 shortage, with a year-end elevation projected at 1,037 feet. Total system storage was around 19.9 million acre-feet in mid-June 2026, down from 23.3 million a year earlier. Basin snowpack peaked at only 60 percent of the 30-year median.
The Five Alternatives in the Draft EIS
The Bureau of Reclamation released a draft environmental impact statement in January 2026 evaluating five options for managing the reservoirs after 2026. The bureau did not pick a preferred alternative and said it planned to pull elements from several into a final consensus-based agreement. A 45-day public comment period ran from January 16 through March 2, 2026, and the final EIS was scheduled for mid-summer 2026, with a record of decision to follow before October 1.
- No Action. Operations would revert to the framework in place before the 2007 Interim Guidelines, using annual operating plans without the tiered shortage system.
- Federal Authorities. The bureau and Interior would use existing statutory powers to protect critical infrastructure at Glen Canyon and Hoover dams, without needing new state agreements.
- Federal Authorities Hybrid. A blend of federal authority with concepts from tribes, federal agencies, and other stakeholders, aimed at distributing storage between Lake Powell and Lake Mead.
- Cooperative Conservation. Based on a joint proposal from seven conservation groups including the National Audubon Society, The Nature Conservancy, and Environmental Defense Fund. It emphasizes stabilizing total system storage and incentivizing voluntary conservation.
- Basin Hybrid. Built from components proposed by the Upper Basin states, the Lower Basin states, and Colorado River basin tribes, intended as a foundation for coordinated operations.
Formal proposals came in from the Upper Basin states, the Lower Basin states, and the Gila River Indian Community. Rather than carry them forward as standalone options, the bureau folded key elements into the Federal Authorities Hybrid and Basin Hybrid alternatives.
The Federal Backup Plan
On June 5, 2026, the Bureau of Reclamation announced that if the seven states stayed deadlocked, the federal government would impose a 10-year management framework on its own authority. Acting Commissioner Scott Cameron called it a practical necessity. “We would love to have a 20-year deal or a 30-year deal,” Cameron said, “but frankly, we haven’t even been able to get seven states to agree on what a two-year deal would look like.”
The proposed federal framework would operate on two-year cycles, with the bureau issuing updated operational guidelines every two years within the 10-year umbrella. Cameron described this as responsive to the “highly unusual hydrological situation” on the river. He also said the federal government would be willing to replace the imposed framework with a seven-state agreement at any point, should one emerge.
To move states toward conservation, the bureau pledged $100 million for the Upper Basin states and $354 million for the Lower Basin states. Those commitments sit atop a larger pool. The Inflation Reduction Act appropriated $4 billion for drought mitigation at reclamation sites, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law included $8.3 billion over five years for water infrastructure. As of mid-2024, the bureau had executed 203 conservation agreements with water agencies and tribes, projecting roughly 1.59 million acre-feet of conservation in the Lower Basin through 2026 and 104,000 acre-feet in the Upper Basin. The largest agreements included up to $140.4 million with the Palo Verde Irrigation District and up to $77.6 million with the Imperial Irrigation District.
Where the States Disagree
The stalemate is between the Upper Basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming) and the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, Nevada). The disagreement is fundamental: who absorbs the shortage when the river doesn’t produce enough for everyone.
The Lower Basin points to what it calls the Upper Basin’s “delivery obligation” under the 1922 Compact, which requires 75 million acre-feet to pass Lees Ferry over any consecutive 10-year period. Arizona’s lead negotiator, Tom Buschatzke, has said any new agreement must preserve that obligation. The Lower Basin also argues the Upper Basin should account for evaporative and system losses between reservoirs, which can exceed one million acre-feet a year and currently fall largely on the Upper Basin’s ledger as a matter of accounting rather than explicit agreement.
The Upper Basin rejects that framing. Colorado’s commissioner, Becky Mitchell, has said the new agreement must not impose a delivery obligation on the Upper Basin “under any context.” The Upper Basin states argue they already absorb uncompensated reductions averaging 1.3 million acre-feet a year, that they do not use their full 7.5-million-acre-foot entitlement, and that the Lower Basin must “first address structural overuse” before asking them for more. They have proposed a supply-driven approach, under which operations would be governed by the actual flows measured at Lees Ferry over the preceding three years.
Reactions to the federal 10-year framework split along the same line. John Entsminger of the Southern Nevada Water Authority called the bureau’s plan “reasonable and rational” and said it may be the best way to avoid more drastic intervention by courts or Congress. Mitchell worried about the instability of constant two-year renegotiations and questioned how states could plan long-term for the 40 million people who depend on the river.
Who Would Face Cuts and How Deep
The draft EIS spelled out mandatory reductions if no deal is reached, and they fall almost entirely on the Lower Basin. Under some alternatives, Arizona could see reductions of up to 58 percent, Nevada up to 46 percent, and the Central Arizona Project, which delivers river water to Phoenix, Tucson, and central Arizona farms, could face cuts as deep as 77 percent. The Colorado River supplies roughly 36 percent of Arizona’s total water. The Upper Basin states would not face mandatory reductions under the federal plan because they do not depend on reservoir releases in the same way.
In May 2026, the three Lower Basin states submitted a joint proposal aimed at bridging the gap through 2028. It identified more than 3.2 million acre-feet in total contributions to the system, anchored by 1.25 million acre-feet in annual reductions split among Arizona (760,000 acre-feet), California (440,000), and Nevada (50,000). It also targeted an additional 700,000 to one million acre-feet in proactive conservation, with California and Arizona each contributing an estimated 300,000 acre-feet and Nevada 100,000. The proposal included roughly 250,000 acre-feet in coordinated reductions with Mexico and extended the existing Intentionally Created Surplus framework from the Drought Contingency Plans, with modifications including a 3 percent annual evaporation charge and a 10 percent assessment on newly created surplus.
The Imperial Irrigation District, the single largest holder of Colorado River water rights, submitted comments to the bureau in March 2026 insisting that any post-2026 framework comply with the priority system that protects its senior rights. The district oversees more than 470,000 acres of farmland and says its growers have conserved more than 9.1 million acre-feet of Colorado River water since 2003.
Tribes in the Negotiation
Twenty-two tribal nations hold quantified rights to roughly 3.2 million acre-feet of Colorado River water each year, about a quarter of the basin’s average supply. Another 12 tribes have unresolved claims that, once adjudicated, will add to the total. Many of these rights predate the 1922 Compact, making them senior to nearly all non-tribal users, but infrastructure gaps have kept many tribes from fully developing or using their water.
Unlike the 1922 negotiations, from which tribes were excluded entirely, tribal nations are formal participants in this process. The Navajo Nation, whose rights in the Colorado River system remain largely unquantified, passed legislation in March 2026 authorizing formal comments on the draft EIS. The resolution, approved unanimously by the Naabik’íyáti’ Committee, called for “active and meaningful Tribal engagement” and a formal government-to-government consultation structure. Delegate Brenda Jesus, the sponsor, described the action as an assertion of “sovereign responsibility to protect the interests of the Navajo Nation.”
A major settlement bill, S. 953, the Northeastern Arizona Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 2025, is under review by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. It would settle claims involving the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe, among more than 20 parties. The bill seeks $5.1 billion in mandatory funding and would let the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe lease and exchange up to 17,050 acre-feet of Colorado River water across both basins. Interior has expressed support for the settlement’s goals but raised concerns about the overall cost. If enacted, it would become part of the Law of the River.
Gila River Indian Community Governor Stephen Roe Lewis has said his tribe is “very concerned with the proposed framework” and would “fight in the courts to protect its water rights and the lower basin if needed.” The post-2026 plan also established a new conservation pool for Arizona tribes estimated at about 280,000 acre-feet through 2028, accounted for within Arizona’s surplus framework.
Glen Canyon Dam and the Threat of Dead Pool
Glen Canyon Dam anchors the physical crisis. Hydropower generation stops if Lake Powell drops below 3,490 feet. In late April 2026, the reservoir was 36 feet above that threshold, with inflows projected at only 16 percent of average. Below the power pool, the dam’s river outlet works at roughly 3,370 feet are the last mechanism for releasing water downstream, and engineers believe they may become functionally unreliable at around 3,394 feet. At that point the system approaches dead pool, where water can no longer pass through the dam to the Grand Canyon and Lake Mead.
The bureau reduced releases from Lake Powell to 6 million acre-feet for the 2026 water year, down from the standard 7.48 million, to slow the decline. That reduction itself pulls Lake Mead lower, which shows the zero-sum bind of managing the two linked reservoirs. The bureau is also conducting an appraisal study on potential dam modifications to accommodate lower water levels, with results expected in late 2026 or early 2027. Any physical changes would require separate congressional authorization and funding.
Mexico’s Share
Mexico is entitled to 1.5 million acre-feet a year under the 1944 Water Treaty. Minute 323, a binational agreement signed in 2017, governs how shortages and surpluses are shared through 2026. When Lake Mead drops below 1,075 feet, Mexico’s annual allotment decreases by 50,000 to 125,000 acre-feet, mirroring the proportional reductions on U.S. states. Above 1,145 feet, Mexico can receive additional water up to a 1.7-million-acre-foot cap.
The Lower Basin states’ May 2026 proposal assumed roughly 250,000 acre-feet in annual coordinated reductions with Mexico. A separate binational negotiation, conducted through the International Boundary and Water Commission, will set Mexico’s post-2026 obligations independently of the interstate process, so the outcome of that track is not resolved inside the domestic Colorado River plan.
Where Litigation Fits In
No lawsuits have been filed as of mid-2026, but nearly everyone involved expects the courtroom to be the next venue. Arizona has publicly stated its readiness to sue to enforce what it reads as a firm delivery obligation from the Upper Basin: 82.5 million acre-feet over any 10-year period under the 1922 Compact. The April 2026 reduction of Lake Powell releases from 7.48 million to 6 million acre-feet could give the Lower Basin grounds to argue the Compact has been breached. Any state-versus-state dispute over an interstate compact would fall under the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Mitchell has acknowledged that the basins are becoming “entrenched in their competing legal theories” and expects litigation. Entsminger has put it more bluntly: if the seven states cannot agree on the Law of the River, “it’s the federal courts” or Congress that will make the decisions. Other parties may challenge the bureau’s new operating guidelines under the Administrative Procedure Act in federal district court. The lack of consensus also raises the possibility of the Secretary of the Interior taking on the role of “water master” over the Upper Basin, a level of federal control the upper states have long resisted.
Whatever framework emerges has to fit inside the Law of the River, a stack of authorities built on the 1922 Compact, the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, the 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Supreme Court’s 1964 ruling in Arizona v. California, and later statutes governing storage projects and salinity. How the 1922 Compact’s delivery provisions read in a world where the river produces far less water than anyone assumed a century ago is the legal question that may ultimately land at the Supreme Court.