Ejusdem generis is a rule of legal interpretation that limits a broad catch-all phrase to items of the same kind as the specific items listed before it. The Latin means “of the same kind,” and the canon applies whenever a statute, contract, or regulation names particular things and then adds a general phrase like “or other similar items.” Rather than letting that general phrase float free as an unlimited grant, courts read it as covering only things that share the character of the specifics that came before.
The Structural Pattern That Triggers It
The canon only kicks in when a document follows a specific grammatical pattern: a list of narrow, particular terms followed by a broad catch-all. A contract might reference “iron, copper, and other minerals.” The specific nouns create a boundary, and the general word gets read to cover only items sharing the same character as iron and copper. Flip the order so the general term comes first, and the canon does not apply.
The specific terms set the baseline. A criminal statute prohibiting possession of “handguns, rifles, shotguns, or other dangerous devices” would be read to reach other weapons, not kitchen knives or baseball bats, because every listed item is a firearm. The specific examples tell you what neighborhood the catch-all lives in.
This setup gives drafters flexibility without letting the catch-all become a blank check. Insurance policies and environmental regulations use the pattern constantly because listing every possible covered event is impossible. The catch-all acts as a safety net for similar items the drafter didn’t think to name, while the specific list keeps that net from stretching to cover everything imaginable.
Finding the Shared Class
The heart of any ejusdem generis argument is identifying what the listed items have in common. Courts call this shared trait the “genus,” and it acts as a filter for the catch-all term. If a statute mentions “magazines, newspapers, and other periodicals,” the shared trait is regular publication on a schedule. That filter lets in newsletters and quarterly journals but keeps out novels and one-time pamphlets. The class has to be narrow enough to actually exclude some things but broad enough that the catch-all still does some work.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Yates v. United States is the most memorable illustration of how the analysis plays out. A commercial fisherman was charged under 18 U.S.C. ยง 1519, which makes it a crime to destroy “any record, document, or tangible object” to obstruct a federal investigation. Yates had thrown undersized fish overboard to hide them from regulators. The question was whether a fish counted as a “tangible object” under the statute.
The Court held it did not. Looking at the words surrounding “tangible object,” the majority noted that “record” and “document” are both things used to store information. Applying ejusdem generis alongside its cousin canon noscitur a sociis, the Court concluded that “tangible object” referred specifically to “the subset of tangible objects used to record or preserve information,” not every physical thing in the world. A fish is undeniably tangible, but it doesn’t store information. The Court also noted that untethering the statute from its financial-fraud origins to cover any physical object regardless of size or significance would stretch the law far beyond what Congress intended.1Justia Law. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)
The genus analysis sometimes turns on whether you’re looking at physical properties or functional roles. A list of “knives, swords, and other instruments” might include a machete if the shared class is “edged weapons” but exclude a letter opener if the context makes clear the class is “combat weaponry.” Courts look at the broader statutory context to decide which framing makes sense. In criminal statutes with harsh penalties, the shared class tends to get read more narrowly, because the rule of lenity pushes courts to resolve genuine ambiguity in the defendant’s favor.
One important limit: the shared trait must be present in every listed item. If even one item breaks the pattern, the genus collapses. A list of “gold, silver, and other materials” could be restricted to precious metals. But “gold, silver, and gravel” has no coherent shared trait, so the catch-all would get its plain, broad meaning instead.
Why Courts Read General Language This Way
The logic behind ejusdem generis connects to another foundational rule of interpretation: every word in a statute or contract should mean something. If a drafter intended the catch-all to cover anything at all, there would be no reason to list specific examples first. By writing “cows, horses, and sheep” before “other livestock,” the drafter signaled a focused intent. The specific terms are the main event, and the catch-all is a safety net for similar items that didn’t make the list. Ignoring that structure would effectively erase the specific words from the document.
In commercial contracts, this tethering prevents unfair surprises. A force majeure clause listing “fire, flood, earthquake, and other acts of God” shouldn’t suddenly encompass an economic recession just because a recession is also beyond the parties’ control. The specific items all involve natural physical disasters, and the catch-all should stay in that lane. Without the canon applying this kind of brake, one vague phrase could rewrite the entire risk allocation the parties negotiated.
Where the Canon Has Real Consequences
Beyond the fish-as-tangible-object question in Yates, one of the most consequential applications of ejusdem generis came in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams. Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act excludes from its coverage “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” The question was whether that exclusion covered all employment contracts or just contracts for transportation workers. The Supreme Court applied ejusdem generis and held that because the two specific terms both describe transportation workers, the catch-all phrase “any other class of workers” should be read to cover only workers in transportation industries, not every employee in interstate commerce.2Legal Information Institute. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
That decision had enormous practical impact. It meant that the vast majority of American workers could be subject to mandatory arbitration agreements, because only transportation workers fell within the FAA’s exclusion. A canon of construction that sounds academic can reshape the legal landscape for millions of people. The genus the Court identified was narrow, and everything outside it lost the benefit of the exclusion.
Force Majeure Clauses
The COVID-19 pandemic generated a wave of litigation over force majeure clauses, and ejusdem generis sat at the center of many of those disputes. A typical clause might list “any hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, or other natural disaster.” Under a strict application, the genus looks like sudden, localized physical catastrophes, and a pandemic doesn’t fit neatly into that category. Legal scholars analyzing these clauses noted that a rigid reading could exclude pandemics as not relevantly like the enumerated physical disasters.
Where a clause listed specific events but included no catch-all phrase at all, the analysis shifted entirely. Without a catch-all, the related canon of expressio unius took over, and an omitted pandemic stayed with whichever party bore the default risk under the rest of the contract.
Insurance Policy Exclusions
Insurance coverage disputes are where ejusdem generis gets some of its hardest workouts. Policies routinely use exclusion clauses that list specific perils followed by a catch-all. One commonly litigated example involves “earth movement” exclusions that list “earthquake, landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, earth rising, or shifting” and then add a catch-all. Courts have applied ejusdem generis to limit the exclusion to natural phenomena, refusing to extend it to human-caused earth disturbances like construction-related settling. The defining characteristic courts identified was events that “would cause such widespread damage to so large a number of policyholders” that the insurer needed to exclude them to remain financially viable.3Judicature. Ejusdem Generis: What Is It Good For?
These cases are particularly striking because the insurance policies often included the phrase “including but not limited to” before the specific list, language drafters typically use as a signal that the list is just illustrative. Courts applied ejusdem generis anyway. The specific examples betrayed the drafter’s intent regardless of the broadening language.
Neighboring Canons of Construction
Ejusdem generis doesn’t operate in isolation. It belongs to a family of association canons that all rest on the same basic insight: words take meaning from the company they keep. Two neighbors matter most for understanding when ejusdem generis is the right tool.
Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a sociis means “it is known by its associates.” Where ejusdem generis specifically addresses a catch-all term following a list, noscitur a sociis is broader; it says that any ambiguous word in a group should be interpreted in light of the other words around it. The two canons are close relatives and often get applied together, as the Supreme Court did in Yates when it used both to narrow the meaning of “tangible object.”1Justia Law. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) The practical difference is that noscitur a sociis can apply to any word in a list, not just a catch-all at the end. If a statute lists “boats, barges, and canoes,” noscitur a sociis might help define what counts as a “barge” by reference to the other watercraft, even though there’s no catch-all phrase triggering ejusdem generis.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
This canon, meaning “the mention of one thing implies exclusion of others,” pulls in a different direction. When a list has no catch-all phrase, expressio unius suggests the list is exhaustive. A statute covering “dogs, cats, and hamsters” with no “or other animals” at the end would likely exclude ferrets entirely. But when the drafter adds a catch-all like “or other household pets,” ejusdem generis takes over, and the list becomes illustrative rather than exhaustive. The catch-all signals that the drafter intended to cover similar unlisted items, not to draw a hard boundary.4Colorado General Assembly. Commonly Applied Rules of Statutory Construction
The interplay between these canons matters enormously in contract disputes. A clause listing “fire, flood, and earthquake” with no catch-all excludes pandemics under expressio unius. Add “or other natural disasters” and the question shifts to ejusdem generis: is a pandemic the same kind of thing as the listed events? The presence or absence of three words at the end of a list can flip the outcome of a multimillion-dollar dispute.
When Ejusdem Generis Does Not Apply
The canon is a tool for resolving ambiguity, and courts set it aside when the conditions aren’t right. Several situations consistently prevent its application.
No Identifiable Shared Class
When the specific items in a list are too varied to share a coherent trait, the genus falls apart and the catch-all keeps its full breadth. The classic example involves a list like “fruit, fodder, farm produce, insecticides, pumps, nails, tools, and wagons” followed by “all manner of merchandise.” Those items are so wildly different that no shared category emerges, so “merchandise” retains its broad dictionary meaning.3Judicature. Ejusdem Generis: What Is It Good For? If a list is a random assortment rather than a targeted grouping, the canon has nothing to work with.
The List Already Exhausts the Category
If the specific items already cover every member of the class, limiting the catch-all to that same class would make it meaningless. When a list names every known type of domestic pet and then adds “or other animals,” the catch-all has to reach beyond pets or it serves no purpose. The rule is supposed to give meaning to general terms, not strangle them.3Judicature. Ejusdem Generis: What Is It Good For?
The Document Overrides It Explicitly
When a contract or statute provides its own definitions or explicitly instructs that a general term should be read broadly, those internal rules take priority over external canons of construction. Ejusdem generis is a default presumption about what the drafter meant, and it gives way when the drafter actually says what they meant. If a contract’s definitions section says “the term ‘equipment’ includes all tangible property regardless of type,” no list of specific equipment earlier in the document will narrow that definition through the canon.
What This Means for Drafting
The cases carry a practical lesson for anyone writing a contract, policy, or regulation: the specific items you list will define the reach of your catch-all, sometimes in ways you didn’t expect. Courts have shown repeatedly that even explicit broadening language doesn’t always prevent the canon from applying.
The phrase “including but not limited to” is the most common attempt to signal that a list is merely illustrative. It doesn’t reliably work. Multiple courts have applied ejusdem generis despite this language, reasoning that the specific items still reveal the drafter’s intent about what category the general term belongs to. In the earth movement insurance cases, “including but not limited to earthquake, landslide, mudflow” was still read to limit the exclusion to natural phenomena despite the broadening language.5Scribes (The American Society of Legal Writers). The Other Side of Ejusdem Generis
The most effective drafting approach is being completely explicit about the intended scope. Instead of listing examples and hoping a catch-all does the heavy lifting, state the breadth directly: “earth movement of any kind” for a broad reading, or “earth movement resulting from sudden natural phenomena such as earthquakes and landslides” for a narrow one. If you want a term to be genuinely unlimited, the cleanest path is often to skip the list entirely and let the broad term stand alone. Every example you provide gives a court raw material for constructing a genus you may not have intended.