Ends of Justice: Continuances, Findings, and the Speedy Trial Clock

An ends-of-justice continuance is a delay a federal judge grants under the Speedy Trial Act after finding, on the record, that the reasons for postponing a criminal trial outweigh the public’s and the defendant’s interest in a speedy one. It is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), and it is the broadest mechanism the Act provides for stopping the 70-day clock between indictment or initial appearance and trial.¹

How the Continuance Fits Into the Speedy Trial Clock

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 sets a hard rule: a federal defendant must generally go to trial within 70 days. The Act then lists periods that don’t count against that clock, such as time consumed by pretrial motions or competency evaluations. Most of those exclusions are narrow and automatic. The ends-of-justice continuance is different. It is discretionary, it can cover almost any reason a judge finds compelling enough, and it requires the judge to say why in the record. Without one of these findings, a delay counts against the 70 days, and once the clock runs out the remedy is dismissal of the indictment.¹

What the Judge Must Find

Section 3161(h)(7)(A) requires the judge to conclude that “the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Subsection (B) then lists the factors the judge must consider in reaching that conclusion:

Whether denying the continuance would make it impossible to continue the proceeding or would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Whether the case is so unusual or complex, because of the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or novel legal questions, that adequate preparation within the normal time limits is unreasonable.
Whether an arrest occurred at a time when it was unreasonable to expect a grand jury to return an indictment within the statutory window, or where the underlying facts are unusually complex.
Whether denying the continuance would deprive the defendant of reasonable time to obtain counsel, unreasonably deny either side continuity of counsel, or deny counsel the time needed for effective preparation, given due diligence.²

The findings must be specific to the case in front of the judge. General references to “the interests of justice” or a bare recitation of the statute do not satisfy the requirement.

What the Judge Cannot Rely On

The statute expressly forbids two categories of reasoning. A judge cannot grant an ends-of-justice continuance because of general congestion of the court’s calendar, and cannot grant one because the prosecution has not been diligent in preparing its case or in obtaining witnesses who were available.¹ Those are the boundaries: everything else the judge might consider must still be tied to the four statutory factors and must survive appellate review as a reasoned application of them.

When the Findings Have to Be on the Record

The Act says the findings must appear “in the record of the case” but does not fix the moment. In Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the Supreme Court called it “best practice” for the judge to articulate the findings at the time the continuance is granted. At the outer limit, the Court held, the findings must be on the record by the time the judge rules on any defense motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial Act violation.³

Some circuits read that timing rule with a degree of flexibility. In United States v. Wasson (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit held that a district court could set out express ends-of-justice findings in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss, rather than at the moment of granting the continuance itself.⁴ The safe reading is that a judge should state the findings when the continuance is granted, but a later articulation before the motion-to-dismiss ruling can still count.

Waiver Doesn’t Work

A defendant cannot agree to skip the process. In Zedner, the defendant signed a form purporting to waive “all time” under the Speedy Trial Act at the district judge’s suggestion, and a 91-day continuance followed without any on-the-record ends-of-justice findings. Years later Zedner moved to dismiss. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in his favor, holding that a defendant cannot prospectively waive the Act’s protections because the statute serves the public interest, not only the defendant’s personal rights. If defendants could waive the clock at will, the Court reasoned, the requirement that judges make specific findings would become pointless.³

The Court also rejected harmless-error review of a missing-findings problem. The statute’s language (“no … period of delay … shall be excludable” without stated reasons) was too absolute to let a reviewing court forgive the omission after the fact.⁵ The practical consequence: any period lacking findings on the record counts against the 70-day clock, and if the total exceeds 70, dismissal follows.

How Long Can the Continuance Last

The statute does not set a maximum length, and the circuits have been working out whether a continuance can be open-ended. In United States v. Harris-Franklin (8th Cir., July 2025), the Eighth Circuit joined the majority position: open-ended ends-of-justice continuances are not categorically prohibited, but they must be “reasonable in length.” A 40-day delay following the appointment of new defense counsel was upheld as reasonable, and the court noted the defense had not objected to the timeline.⁶ Whether a given continuance is reasonable turns on the facts a judge invoked to justify it in the first place.

Preparation Time Is Not Automatically Excluded

One point often confuses defendants and lawyers new to the Act. The automatic exclusion for pretrial motions covers only the period “from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Time a judge grants beforehand for preparing the motion is not automatically excluded. The Supreme Court so held in Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010), reversing the Eighth Circuit.⁷ A district court can still give the parties preparation time, but only by granting an ends-of-justice continuance with the required findings. Reading the statute otherwise, the Court explained, would render the preparation-related factors under § 3161(h)(7) “a nullity.”⁸ So preparation time and complexity time both run through the ends-of-justice mechanism, not around it.

What Happens if the Findings Are Missing

The remedy for a Speedy Trial Act violation is dismissal of the indictment. When a judge grants a continuance without on-the-record ends-of-justice findings, that period is not excluded, it counts against the 70 days, and if the aggregate delay pushes the case past the clock the defendant can move to dismiss. Under Zedner, neither a defense waiver nor a harmless-error argument saves the government. That is why the findings requirement, easy to overlook when a continuance seems uncontroversial, does the real work of the statute: it forces the reason for delay onto the record, where an appellate court can test it.

1
Cornell Law Institute. 18 U.S. Code § 3161 – Time Limits and Exclusions
2
Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 18 U.S.C. Chapter 208 – Speedy Trial
3
Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489
4
Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog. Speedy Trial Act Does Not Require Articulation of Ends-of-Justice Findings at Time of Continuance
5
Library of Congress. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (Full Opinion)
6
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. United States v. Harris-Franklin, No. 24-2451
7
Cornell Law Institute. Bloate v. United States, No. 08-728
8
Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196