The most famous employment discrimination cases in the United States are a set of Supreme Court decisions, running from 1971 to 2023, that built the legal tests courts still use, expanded federal protections to groups the original statutes seemed to overlook, and defined what an employer can and cannot do when a worker pushes back. Read together, they answer the practical question behind most workplace disputes: what does the law actually require, and what would a claim need to prove?
Race Discrimination and the Two Frameworks That Started It All
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)
Before Griggs, proving discrimination meant proving the employer meant to discriminate. Duke Power required a high school diploma and two aptitude tests for most positions. The requirements looked neutral on paper but screened out Black candidates at dramatically higher rates, and neither test measured anything tied to actual job performance.1Justia. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
The Supreme Court unanimously struck down the policy and created what is now called disparate impact. An employment practice can violate Title VII even without discriminatory intent. If a hiring test, credential, or other rule disproportionately excludes a protected group, the employer must prove the requirement is a genuine business necessity tied to job performance. Many workplace claims still begin here, not with a smoking-gun email but with a policy that falls harder on one group than another.1Justia. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973)
Griggs addressed neutral policies. McDonnell Douglas addressed the harder problem of intentional discrimination an employer tries to hide. Because employers rarely admit bias, the Court built a three-step framework that courts still use in nearly every disparate treatment case.2Justia. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
First, the employee establishes a basic case: membership in a protected group, qualification for the position, rejection, and the employer’s continued search for someone with similar qualifications. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Third, the employee gets a chance to show that reason is a pretext for discrimination. Evidence that comparable employees outside the protected group were treated better, or a broader pattern in the employer’s hiring history, can carry that final step.2Justia. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
Sexual Harassment Recognized as Sex Discrimination
Before 1986 it was an open question whether sexual harassment was covered by federal employment law at all. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court unanimously held that sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII, even when the employee suffers no lost wages or demotion. The bank had argued the relationship was “voluntary,” but the Court drew a critical line: the question is not whether the employee voluntarily participated, but whether the conduct was unwelcome. An employee who goes along with a supervisor’s advances out of fear of losing a job has not consented in the eyes of the law.3Justia. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (2004) extended the principle to employees pushed out the door. If working conditions grow so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign, the resignation can be treated as a firing for legal purposes. That doctrine is called constructive discharge, and it prevents employers from escaping liability just because the worker technically left on their own.4Justia. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)
Gender Stereotyping and Mixed Motives
Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse who had landed a $25 million contract and billed more hours than any other candidate for partnership. She was denied promotion anyway. Partners described her as “macho” and “aggressive.” The partner responsible for explaining the decision advised her to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”5Justia. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
The Supreme Court ruled in 1989 that penalizing an employee for not conforming to gender stereotypes is sex discrimination under Title VII. The decision also created the mixed-motive framework: once an employee proves gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the employer can avoid liability only by proving it would have made the same decision regardless. Legitimate concerns about a candidate do not wash away the taint of sex-based reasoning when both factors drove the outcome.5Justia. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
Pay Discrimination and the Ledbetter Fix
Lilly Ledbetter worked at Goodyear Tire for nearly two decades before discovering she earned significantly less than male colleagues doing the same job. The Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that her claim was time-barred. Under Title VII as the Court read it, the charge had to be filed within 180 days of the original discriminatory pay decision, not the date of a paycheck reflecting that decision.6Justia. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
Congress responded in 2009 with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which resets the filing clock each time an employer issues a paycheck, pays benefits, or distributes other compensation reflecting a discriminatory decision. Under the amended law, a new unlawful practice occurs every pay period a worker receives compensation shaped by past discrimination.7Congress.gov. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law 111-2
Pregnancy Accommodation
Peggy Young, a UPS driver, asked for light-duty work during her pregnancy. UPS refused, even though it provided light duty to workers injured on the job, employees with ADA-qualifying disabilities, and drivers who lost their commercial licenses. In Young v. United Parcel Service (2015), the Court held that pregnant workers can challenge accommodation denials using the McDonnell Douglas framework. When an employer accommodates a large number of non-pregnant workers with similar physical limitations but refuses to accommodate pregnant employees, and cannot offer a reason for the difference beyond cost or convenience, the employee can show the policy is pretextual.8Oyez. Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. The ruling stopped short of giving pregnant workers automatic access to every accommodation available to anyone else, but it made it much harder for employers to carve pregnancy out of their light-duty policies without genuine justification.
LGBTQ+ Workers Under Title VII
For decades it was unclear whether Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of sex” reached sexual orientation or gender identity. Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) resolved the question by consolidating lawsuits from employees fired for being gay or transgender. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that firing someone for being homosexual or transgender is inherently sex-based discrimination. The reasoning was direct: if an employer fires a man for being attracted to men but would not fire a woman for the same attraction, the employer is treating the employee differently because of sex.9Justia. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___ (2020)
Bostock did not create a new protected category so much as recognize that the existing prohibition on sex discrimination already covered these situations. The decision gave LGBTQ+ employees nationwide a federal cause of action that previously existed only in some states.
Age Claims and a Tougher Proof Standard
Age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act operate under a harder standard than Title VII claims. Gross v. FBL Financial Services (2009) locked that in. Jack Gross was reassigned to a lower position and replaced by someone he had previously supervised. He argued age was at least a motivating factor. The Supreme Court ruled that motivating factor is not enough for an ADEA claim. The employee must prove age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse action, meaning the employer would not have made the same decision if age had not been a factor. The Court also refused to import the mixed-motive burden-shift from Title VII cases, leaving the full burden on the employee throughout.10Justia. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)
Religious Accommodation
EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores (2015)
Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, wore a hijab to her interview at Abercrombie & Fitch. She scored well enough to be hired, but a manager suspected the headscarf was religious and decided it conflicted with the company’s dress code. Abercrombie argued it bore no liability because Elauf never explicitly asked for a religious accommodation. The Supreme Court disagreed. Title VII prohibits making an applicant’s religious practice a factor in employment decisions, whether the employer knows about the practice for certain or merely suspects it. Employers cannot avoid liability by not asking.11Justia. EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015)
Groff v. DeJoy (2023)
For nearly 50 years, many lower courts read a phrase from Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (1977) to mean an employer could deny a religious accommodation whenever it imposed more than a “de minimis cost.” That made saying no almost trivially easy. Gerald Groff, a postal worker and Sunday Sabbath observer, challenged his employer’s refusal to excuse him from Sunday shifts. In a unanimous 2023 decision, the Court clarified that the de minimis reading was wrong. The correct standard is that the accommodation must result in “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.” That is a meaningfully higher bar, requiring genuine hardship rather than administrative inconvenience.12Justia. Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. ___ (2023)
Disability Rights Under the ADA
Casey Martin was a professional golfer with a degenerative circulatory disorder that made walking a course extremely painful and medically risky. He asked the PGA Tour to let him use a golf cart during tournaments. The PGA refused, calling walking an essential part of the competition. In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin (2001), the Supreme Court held that the events qualified as a public accommodation under the ADA and that allowing a cart was a reasonable accommodation that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. The “fundamental alteration” test remains the key limit on what an employer must provide.13Justia. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
The boundary appeared the next year. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (2002), the Court held that an employer can refuse to hire someone if the job would pose a direct threat to that individual’s own health or safety, not just to others. Mario Echazabal had liver damage that would worsen with exposure to chemicals at a Chevron refinery. The Court upheld an EEOC regulation allowing employers to screen out workers in that situation.14Justia. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002)
Retaliation Has the Broadest Reach
Retaliation is now the single most common type of charge filed with the EEOC, and Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White (2006) defined its boundaries. Sheila White, the only woman in her department at a railroad yard, filed a sex discrimination complaint. Her employer reassigned her to less desirable duties and later suspended her without pay for 37 days before reinstating her with back pay. The Supreme Court held that retaliation under Title VII is not limited to actions that affect job title or paycheck. Any employer action that would discourage a reasonable worker from filing or supporting a discrimination charge qualifies. The standard is whether the action was “materially adverse” enough to deter a reasonable person from exercising their rights.15Justia. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
Retaliation protections apply to anyone who complains about discrimination or participates in an investigation, whether or not the underlying claim ultimately succeeds. Reporting what you genuinely believe is discrimination, cooperating with an EEOC investigation, or testifying for a coworker are all protected.
What You Have to Do to Use Any of This
The rulings above only help if you act within the deadlines. Before filing a federal employment discrimination lawsuit, you generally have to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The standard deadline is 180 calendar days from the date of the discriminatory act, extended to 300 days if a state or local agency enforces a law prohibiting the same type of discrimination. For pay discrimination, the Ledbetter Act resets the window with each discriminatory paycheck.16U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination
If a claim succeeds, federal law caps the combined total of compensatory and punitive damages based on employer size:
- 15 to 100 employees: up to $50,000
- 101 to 200 employees: up to $100,000
- 201 to 500 employees: up to $200,000
- More than 500 employees: up to $300,000
These caps apply per plaintiff under Title VII and the ADA and cover emotional distress, future losses, and punitive awards combined. They do not cap back pay, front pay, or attorney’s fees, which are recoverable separately.17Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 42 U.S. Code 1981a – Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination in Employment State anti-discrimination laws often carry different caps or none at all, which is why many plaintiffs file under both.