Judges reach the bench in state courts through four main routes: partisan election, nonpartisan election, merit-based selection, and appointment by a governor or legislature. Roughly 39 states use elections for at least some of their courts, and many states mix methods across court levels. How judges are selected for state courts often looks different in practice than on paper, because governors fill a large share of mid-term vacancies by appointment even in states that officially elect their judges.
Partisan Elections
In a partisan judicial election, candidates appear on the ballot with a party label next to their name, just as candidates for governor or the legislature do. Voters unfamiliar with the candidates can fall back on party affiliation the same way they would in any other race. Five states use partisan elections at every level of their judiciary, and several more use them for at least one court level.
The upside is transparency: voters know where a candidate’s political sympathies lie. The downside is the same. Judges who run under a party banner face pressure to align with that party’s base, which can create at least the appearance that rulings follow ideology rather than law. Partisan races also tend to draw the most campaign money.
Nonpartisan Elections
Nonpartisan elections work the same way, except candidates appear on the ballot without a party designation. About 13 states use this method for their highest court, and roughly 19 use it for at least one lower court. The idea is to push voters toward evaluating candidates on qualifications and temperament rather than party loyalty.
In practice, the line between the two blurs. Candidates still collect endorsements from political figures, and their donors often have clear ideological leanings. A voter paying close attention can usually work out where a nonpartisan candidate sits on the political spectrum. Still, removing the party label takes away the easiest cue for straight-ticket voting.
Merit Selection: The Missouri Plan
About 14 states use some form of merit selection, a hybrid approach most commonly called the Missouri Plan after the state that pioneered it in 1940. It splits the process into three stages: commission screening, gubernatorial appointment, and voter retention.
The Nominating Commission
The process starts with a nonpartisan nominating commission made up of lawyers and non-lawyer citizens. When a seat opens, the commission solicits applications, reviews qualifications and character, conducts interviews, and narrows the field to a short list, typically three names. The governor then picks from that list, not from the full pool of applicants. That constraint is the point: the governor gets a choice, but only among candidates an independent body has already vetted.
Retention Elections
After serving an initial term, often around one year, the appointed judge faces a retention election. There is no opponent. The ballot asks voters whether the judge should stay in office for a full term. A “yes” vote keeps the judge; a “no” vote removes them. This gives the public a check on judicial performance without the fundraising and partisan dynamics of a contested race.
Judges almost never lose retention elections. Failure is rare, though it happens in high-profile cases where organized opposition campaigns target a specific ruling. The low failure rate is either a sign that the system works or a sign that voters do not pay much attention to down-ballot retention questions. Probably some of both.
Gubernatorial and Legislative Appointment
Some states skip elections entirely and let the governor appoint judges, much like the federal model. In most of these systems, the governor’s choice needs confirmation from the state legislature or an executive council. A few states give the governor broad discretion; others require the governor to choose from a list generated by a screening committee.
Legislative appointment is the rarest method. Only two states, South Carolina and Virginia, empower their legislatures to appoint state high court judges to a first full term. In legislative appointment states, selection essentially plays out as a vote among lawmakers, concentrating power in the hands of the majority party.
How Mid-Term Vacancies Actually Get Filled
Even in states that officially use elections to choose judges, a large share of judges first reach the bench through appointment to fill a mid-term vacancy. When a judge retires, dies, or resigns before their term ends, someone has to fill the seat until the next scheduled election. In most of the 22 states that choose supreme court justices through contested elections, the governor fills those interim vacancies by appointment. Research from the American Judicature Society found that roughly 40 percent of all judgeships in elective states were initially filled this way. In some states, the figure reaches 80 or 90 percent.
So the formal selection method on paper can differ significantly from how judges actually get their jobs. A state might hold judicial elections every six years, but if most judges are appointed to vacancies and then run as incumbents, the election becomes more of a ratification than a true contest. Eight elective states require governors to use a nominating commission when filling vacancies, whether by constitutional mandate, statute, or executive order.
Money in Judicial Elections
Spending on state judicial campaigns has escalated. In the 2023–24 election cycle, candidates, interest groups, and political parties spent at least $157 million on state supreme court races alone, 35 percent more than any previous cycle and nearly double what was spent in 2015–16. Much of this money comes from groups with a direct interest in cases those courts will decide: trial lawyers, business associations, and advocacy organizations on both sides.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the tension between campaign money and judicial impartiality in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. in 2009. The case involved a coal company executive who spent $3 million supporting a judicial candidate’s election to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals while the company had a $50 million case pending before that court. After winning his seat, the new justice refused to recuse himself and cast the deciding vote in the company’s favor. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Due Process Clause required recusal, finding that when a party has a “significant and disproportionate influence” in placing a judge on the bench through campaign spending, and that party has a case pending or imminent before the court, the risk of actual bias is too high to tolerate.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
The Caperton ruling set a constitutional floor, not a ceiling. The Court emphasized that it applied to “extreme facts” and did not create a bright-line dollar threshold for mandatory recusal. Many states have since adopted their own, more detailed recusal rules that go further than what the Constitution requires.1Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
Judicial Performance Evaluations
One persistent criticism of retention elections is that voters lack meaningful information about the judge on the ballot. Several states have responded by creating formal judicial performance evaluation programs. These programs collect feedback through surveys of attorneys, jurors, litigants, witnesses, and court staff who have observed the judge firsthand. The commission rates judges on criteria like command of the law, courtroom management, and whether the judge treats people with respect.
The results are published before retention elections through voter guides, dedicated websites, and in some states, pamphlets mailed to every registered voter. States with well-established programs, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, New Mexico, and Utah, maintain public websites with detailed evaluation histories going back years. The commission typically issues a recommendation of “meets” or “does not meet” judicial performance standards, giving voters a simple signal even if they do not read the full report.
Qualifications, Terms, and Mandatory Retirement
Who Can Become a Judge
Every state sets its own qualification requirements, and they vary more than most people expect. For major trial courts and appellate courts, candidates almost always need a law degree, admission to the state bar, and several years of legal experience. A trial court judge might need five years of practice; a supreme court justice might need ten. States also impose age minimums and residency requirements.
The picture looks different at the lowest court levels. Around 32 states allow people without law degrees to serve as judges on limited-jurisdiction courts like justice courts, magistrate courts, or town and village courts. These courts handle minor matters such as traffic violations, small claims, and local ordinances, and in rural areas, requiring a law degree would make it difficult to fill every seat. The trend is toward requiring legal training even at these levels, but non-lawyer judges still preside over a significant number of low-level courts.
Term Lengths
Unlike federal judges, who serve for life, state judges serve fixed terms. Trial court judges typically serve terms of four to fifteen years, with an average around six to seven years. Judges on a state’s highest court tend to serve longer terms, generally six to fifteen years, with an average near eight to nine years. Three states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, grant their highest court judges life tenure or tenure until mandatory retirement, more closely mirroring the federal system. At the end of a term, judges face reelection, reappointment, or a retention vote, depending on the state’s selection method.
Mandatory Retirement
About 31 states and the District of Columbia set mandatory retirement ages for judges. The most common ceiling is 70, though several states set it at 72 or 75. Vermont is the outlier at 90. In many states, a judge who reaches the retirement age mid-term can finish out that term. The remaining states impose no age limit, though a few create indirect pressure: in Arkansas and North Dakota, judges who continue serving past a certain age forfeit their earned retirement benefits.
How a Judge Can Be Removed
Every state and the District of Columbia maintains a judicial conduct commission, board, or office responsible for investigating complaints against sitting judges. These bodies operate independently from the courts they oversee. Complaints can come from anyone: litigants, attorneys, court staff, or members of the public. They cover a broad range of misconduct, including conflicts of interest, abuse of authority, improper communications with one side in a case, chronic delay in issuing decisions, and rude or abusive behavior on the bench.
Sanctions run from private warnings and public censure up to suspension and, in the most serious cases, a recommendation that the judge be removed from office. These commissions handle the vast majority of judicial discipline matters. Impeachment by the state legislature exists for extreme situations, but it is cumbersome by design and reserved as a last resort.