The United States has 17 Biosafety Level 4 laboratories that are either functional or under construction, more than any other country in the world, according to a 2025 study published in the Journal of Public Health. That study identified 110 such labs globally across 34 countries. The count has shifted over the years as facilities open, close, or move through validation, but the U.S. has consistently held the largest national concentration of these maximum-containment sites, where researchers work in fully enclosed protective suits with pathogens like Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, and Nipah.
An earlier tally from the 2023 Global BioLabs Report produced by King’s College London put the U.S. figure at 28 BSL-4 and enhanced BSL-3 labs in operation with three more in development, out of 69 BSL-4 labs worldwide. The gap between counts reflects methodology: some tallies include enhanced BSL-3 space, some count individual lab suites, and others count by institution.
Where the U.S. BSL-4 Labs Are
The U.S. BSL-4 network is run by a mix of federal civilian agencies, the military, universities, and one private research institute.
Federal Civilian Labs
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta runs one of the country’s longest-established BSL-4 programs and serves as a reference laboratory for dangerous pathogens.
The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases operates the Rocky Mountain Laboratories Integrated Research Facility in Hamilton, Montana, which opened in March 2008. It contains about 6,750 square feet of BSL-4 and animal quarter space inside a 105,000-square-foot building, employs roughly 500 people, and has been involved in COVID-19 and remdesivir research. A second NIAID facility, the Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, was one of the few labs in the world capable of medical imaging on animals under BSL-4 containment; it was shut down by the Trump administration in 2025 after an April 2025 safety stand-down that NIH officials said involved contract personnel issues that “compromised the facility’s safety culture.”
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, also at Fort Detrick, is operated by the Battelle National Biodefense Institute as a federally funded research and development center for the Department of Homeland Security. It performs bioforensic analysis and biological threat characterization and remains operational as of 2026.
The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas, is the newest major addition, built to replace the aging Plum Island Animal Disease Center. It is the first U.S. facility with BSL-4 containment capable of housing large livestock. Construction finished in May 2022, and the facility entered an operational endurance period for testing and validation. The USDA has stated it “will not issue a certificate of registration allowing select agent research at NBAF until all requirements are satisfied,” and the transfer of the science mission from Plum Island is expected to take several years.
University Labs
Two universities run BSL-4 labs with NIAID grant support. The Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch opened in 2008 and anchors the NIAID Laboratory Network. It handles select agents ranging from hemorrhagic fever viruses to anthrax and plague, hosts the World Reference Center for Emerging Viruses and Arboviruses with more than 8,000 virus strains, and supports over 120 faculty, staff, and students.
Boston University’s National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories received final regulatory approval for BSL-4 work in December 2017 and began its first BSL-4 research, on Ebola and Marburg, in August 2018. NIAID provides over $10 million a year to support its BSL-4 operations.
Georgia State University in Atlanta maintains a High Containment Core that includes a BSL-4 cabinet laboratory registered with and regularly inspected by the CDC, which the university describes as “one of the few bio-safety level 4 labs in a university setting.”
Military
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick is the only Department of Defense laboratory with BSL-4 containment. USAMRIID leads the military’s work on highly regulated select agents. The CDC ordered it shut down in July 2019 after finding personnel recertification failures and a faulty wastewater decontamination system tied to a broken steam sterilization plant. After a new chemical wastewater treatment system was put in, USAMRIID’s Federal Select Agent Program registration was fully restored on March 27, 2020.
Private Sector
Texas Biomedical Research Institute in San Antonio operates the only privately owned BSL-4 laboratory in the United States. The facility has 1,200 square feet of BSL-4 space alongside 11,000 square feet of BSL-3 labs, focused on Ebola, Marburg, Lassa fever, and coronaviruses. As of 2017 it was running at maximum capacity. A $210 million modernization and expansion project was about halfway complete as of mid-2025, with a new 29,000-square-foot containment lab expected to be finished around 2028.
Who Regulates BSL-4 Labs
No single federal agency oversees all high-containment laboratories in the United States. Oversight runs through a patchwork of programs and agency-specific rules that multiple Government Accountability Office reports have described as fragmented.
The primary regulatory mechanism is the Federal Select Agent Program, jointly managed by the CDC’s Division of Regulatory Science and Compliance and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. It was established under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 and governs the possession, use, and transfer of biological agents deemed severe threats to public health, animal health, or agricultural products. Registered entities must designate a responsible official, undergo regular inspections, maintain security and biosafety plans, and report any theft, loss, or release. All personnel with access to select agents must pass FBI security risk assessments. As of December 2016, 276 laboratories were registered with the program.
The detailed requirements sit in 42 CFR Part 73, which covers security, biosafety, incident response, training, transfers, and recordkeeping. Agents designated “Tier 1,” those posing the greatest risk of deliberate misuse, face additional security requirements. Broader safety practices follow the CDC and NIH publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, but that guidance is not legally binding across the board, and labs not working with select agents can operate without comprehensive federal oversight.
How Safe Are They?
The GAO has repeatedly flagged gaps in the oversight framework. Its 2009 report (GAO-09-574) concluded that because no single agency tracks the expansion of high-containment labs nationwide, “the government cannot determine if current capacity meets or exceeds national needs or if facilities are operated safely.” The expansion after the 2001 anthrax attacks, fueled by roughly $1 billion in annual biodefense research funding, was driven by individual agency decisions rather than a coordinated national strategy.
A 2017 follow-up (GAO-18-145) found the Select Agent Program still did not fully meet key elements of effective oversight. It lacked structural independence from the labs it regulated, had not formally assessed which activities posed the highest risk, and operated without a joint workforce plan. The GAO issued 11 recommendations, which HHS and USDA agreed to implement, and as recently as March 2026 it continued calling for greater transparency on high-risk pathogen research.
Public safety incidents have shaped that record:
- In 2014, up to 75 CDC workers were potentially exposed to live anthrax after researchers failed to properly inactivate samples. Around the same time, six forgotten vials of smallpox, two containing live virus, were found in a cold storage room at an FDA laboratory on the NIH campus in Bethesda, Maryland, and a CDC lab accidentally shipped a low-pathogenicity influenza sample contaminated with H5N1 to a USDA poultry lab. The CDC temporarily closed the involved labs, halted shipments from its BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities, and appointed a deputy director to oversee safety improvements.
- USAMRIID’s 2019 shutdown followed CDC findings of biosafety lapses including a malfunctioning wastewater decontamination system. The lab operated at partial capacity for months before full clearance in March 2020.
- The University of Texas Medical Branch reported three potential worker exposure events in 2024: a needlestick involving Chapare virus, a needlestick involving anthrax, and a specimen vial leak involving Mayaro virus. No infections resulted, and the institution updated its needle safety guidance campus-wide. UTMB has disclosed 69 incidents total since 2002, though the director of the Galveston National Laboratory has stated that no one has ever become ill due to lab work at its facilities.
- At Rocky Mountain Laboratories, two NIAID researchers, Vincent Munster and Claude Kwe, face federal criminal charges for allegedly transporting undeclared biological samples, identified by the FBI as containing deactivated mpox, chickenpox, and human DNA, into the U.S. from the Republic of Congo in January 2025. A potential exposure to Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus occurred in February 2026 after a glove was damaged, and another employee suffered a monkey bite that penetrated protective gear. Montana Senator Tim Sheehy requested information from the HHS Inspector General regarding lab incidents and oversight at the facility.
A 2026 study in the Journal of Infection analyzing biosafety incidents from 1900 to 2025 found that the main drivers of laboratory-associated outbreaks and fatalities were failures to fully inactivate dangerous pathogens and leaks involving wastewater or infectious aerosols. Those are operational failures rather than issues inherent to any particular biosafety level.
The U.S. in Global Context
The 2023 Global BioLabs Report counted 69 BSL-4 labs worldwide (51 operational, 15 planned, 3 under construction) across 27 countries, roughly double the number from a decade earlier. More than half of the world’s BSL-4 labs capable of housing infected animals were in the United States. About 75 percent of BSL-4 labs globally are in urban areas, raising the potential consequences of any accidental release. Nine countries announced plans for new BSL-4 facilities following the COVID-19 pandemic, many of them scoring relatively low on governance and biosafety oversight measures. Only Canada, the report found, had comprehensive national legislation overseeing all dual-use research regardless of funding source. The United States scored 42 out of 48 on the report’s biorisk management index, second only to Canada, with high marks in biosafety and biosecurity and a lower score of 5 out of 10 on dual-use research governance.